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Abstract
Papers assessing the antitrust effect on cartel cases usually take the form of a quantify-
ing approach, measuring the impact on prices with methods like before-and-after dummy
regressions, difference-in-difference, or synthetic controls designs. However, these ap-
proaches have some downsides( notably, the requirement of establishing an exogenous
date or breakthrough event, based on assumptions that may not be accurate). To over-
come this weakness, we applied Structural Break Analysis (Bai and Perron Test) and
Markov Switching Regressions to four cases in the Brazilian fuel market (Brasilia, Belo
Horizonte, São Lúıs and Londrina) to analyze the effectiveness of competition policies.
As a comparative test between MSR and Bai Perron procedures, our paper shows that
the former was more sensible to transitions between regimes, without missing breaks,
and exhibited precise results. From the point of view of the antitrust policy evaluation,
our findings indicate a low capacity of the antitrust authorities to extinguish price-fixing
practices in targeted markets.
Keywords: collusion, antitrust policy, Brazil, fuel market, structural breaks, markov
switch, policy evaluation.
1 Introduction
For decades, the Brazilian economy was characterized by oligopolized and heavily regulated
markets, with some legal cartels, an outcome from the industrial policies adopted before the
1990s (Frischtak, 1980; Considera, 2002). Therefore, the practice of harms against free compe-
tition seems to be, until today, widespread in several productive sectors. That’s why dealing
with anti-competitive conducts, especially cartel cases with price-fixing behavior, is, probably,
one of the most prominent aspects of the Brazilian antitrust authority’s work. Some of the
recent episodes had enormous political repercussions, such as the subway cartel in São Paulo,
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the bid-rigging in Petrobras’ auctions, or the prosecution against JBS, the largest producer of
animal protein in the world.
In most cases, these investigations turn public after major police/antitrust agents dawn raids,
with extensive media coverage and many preventive arrest warrants against the scheme’s lead-
ers. However, after the cameras are turned off, what happens? Antitrust litigation can go
on for a decade until the final judgment. During this period, firms and individuals end up
signing leniency agreements, exempting themselves from fines or receiving discounts. All this
considered, what is the post-cartel behavior of sued firms and individuals? How effective is
the antitrust action? In some sense, answering these questions is the purpose of this paper, in
order to analyze the effectiveness of antitrust policies in Brazil.
This paper relies on Structural Break Analysis (Bai and Perron Test) and Markov Switching
Regressions, methods widely used by macroeconomists to study business cycles, but which
have recently been adopted by Industrial Organization researchers, although with an emphasis
on screening and not on an assessment of the effectiveness of antitrust prosecution. As an
auxiliary method and a type of robustness check, we also combine these two approaches with
a traditional IO conduct parameter model (Bresnahan, 1989) (which helped us to identify and
get some certainty about collusion and ”competition” periods).
Commonly, papers studying the antitrust effect on cartel cases take the form of a quantifying
approach, trying to measure the impact on prices with methods like before-and-after dummy
regressions, difference-in-difference, or synthetic controls designs. Although this kind of policy
assessment is still just beginning in Brazil, there are some examples such as Lucinda and Seixas
(2016); Cuiabano (2019); Afonso and Féres (2017). However, despite their importance and
robustness, these approaches have some downsides. Before the analysis, researchers should
establish one exogenous date or breakthrough event based on assumptions that may not be
accurate. After all, they might end up with treatment effects composed of different regimes
(collusion, price-wars, or competition), resulting in under or overestimates, as shown in Boswijk
et al. (2019).
Unlike, the methods adopted in our paper set the breakpoints endogenously and maps the
cartel behavior evolution through time. Therefore, it’s possible to obtain evidence about the
effectiveness of different measures against cartels implemented in different prosecution phases.
It isn’t our goal in this paper, but identifying correctly the collusion phases allows us to estimate,
with more precision, the actual damage caused by the cartel or the real price impact of antitrust
policy.
These empirical techniques were applied to four cartel cases in the Brazilian fuel market
(Braśılia, Belo Horizonte, São Lúıs, and Londrina). Expenses on transportation, in which
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fuel prices are very relevant, represent a share of 18% of Brazilian households’ budget (higher
than spending on food), according to the most recent Family Budget Survey (POF-IBGE 2017-
2018). Therefore, the distributive impact of price-fixing schemes is considerable. A study from
CADE (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica, Brazilian antitrust authority)1 esti-
mated that the Braśılia’s fuel cartel, a scheme that managed to raise prices by just over 8%,
caused, in one year, about US$ 75 million in losses to consumers. Additionally, price-fixing in
the fuel market is undoubtedly responsible for the largest number of complaints and prosecu-
tions against Brazil’s noncompetitive practices. Since 2012, the first year after the reform of
the antitrust law, Brazilian authority has judged 25 cases involving irregularities in fuel retail,
with 15 convictions and fines amounting to US$ 100 million. Finally, free and open access data
on resale prices, wholesale prices, volumes, margins, and costs of retail fuel stations, provided
by ANP (Oil Market Regulatory Agency), allow great flexibility in the econometric approach
well as replications and comparisons between different studies.
Apart from the vast theoretical and empirical literature that discuss the deterrent effect of
antitrust policy against cartels (as summarized in Ordóñez-de Haro and Torres, 2014), this
paper is linked to yet a small but promising body of works that applies endogenously dating
techniques to price-fixing cases, as Boshoff and van Jaarsveld (2019); Crede (2019); Boswijk
et al. (2019); Silveira et al. (2019) (the last one adopted a Markov regime change approach
based in GARCH models).
As our main contribution, we look to data not only concerned in screen cartels or estimate
damages but tried to establish links between breaks in pricing behavior and real measures
taken by authorities against cartels. And for this purpose, the fact that we exploited the tradi-
tional IO conduct parameter model to identify collusion regimes is a relevant innovation to the
practitioner’s toolbox. Additionally, as far as we know, this work is the first to systematically
apply simultaneously Structural Breaks tests and Markov Switching Regressions to an extended
set of cartel cases, which allow comparing the strengths and weakness of these approaches.
Considering that these methods were applied to a market with known instability in collusion
arrangement, our work also contributes to analyzing the two techniques’ sensibility.
As a comparative test between MSR and Bai and Perron procedures, our results show that
despite the relative accuracy of structural breaks effectively signaled, the breakpoints test might
be less useful when we suspect recurrent collusion or instability in cartel agreements. Since
we must define partitions of the sample, with a minimal size that allows the econometric
estimation, it will probably miss some breaks or shorter episodes. In fact, we have observed
supposedly missing breaks in our set of cartel cases (in other words, the Bai and Perron Test
are somehow more vulnerable to Type II error, despite no evidence for systematically Type I
1Motta and Resende (2019)
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errors). We also found that when markets suffer from successive periods of collusion followed
by price-wars or competition phases, it’s hard to interpret the results from break estimation
without other information sources. Unlike, Markov Switching techniques seem to be more
sensitive to transitions between regimes, without missing breaks, and gave us more precise
results. Although, in some cases, we had to count on conduct parameters to identify the
regimes.
From the point of view of the antitrust policy evaluation, our findings seem to indicate a low
capacity of the authorities to extinguish price-fixing practices in targeted markets. The collusive
behavior in fuel retailing is quite resilient, with strong recidivism or residual collusion after the
antitrust intervention. Except for Braśılia’s cartel case, the data indicates that cartel episodes
end less because of the authority’s action and more due to natural changes in the market.
At best, we can infer that the competition policy is acting to make price-fixing schemes more
unstable.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical background
of post-cartel behavior. Next, Section 3 discusses relevant aspects of the Brazilian fuel market.
Section 4 presents our econometric procedures, and Section 5 describes our data and some
modeling issues. Finally, Section 6 shows our main results and findings, and Section 7 concludes
with some policy implications.
2 “Post-Cartel Behavior”
Intuitively, we can speculate the effects of antitrust action on the market affected by a cartel.
The most obvious and the reason for the existence of an anti-collusion policy would be the
re-establishment of adequate competition levels, which leads to a price reduction and increase
in quantity sold (and the respective benefits: rising economic allocative efficiency and con-
sumers purchase power). However, the results would not necessarily be the return to marginal
cost prices. They could vary according to what would be considered natural regarding the
market structure: pure competition, in the case of low concentration, or a type of oligopolistic
competition (à la Bertrand, Cournot, and others) in concentrated markets, with barriers to
entry.
There are no guarantees that the competition authority’s action will be effective and, therefore,
the market may remain collusive, and prices will be at levels of the pre-intervention phase.
Finally, as can be found in the empirical literature, there are indications that, in some cases,
the effects are mixed. There is not necessarily a return to competition, not even the evident
maintenance of collusive practice. Markets could suffer a hysteresis effect with changes in the
pricing strategy, but prices will still be above the competitive level. A whole spectrum of states
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could explain this new market behavior. As an example, we may face a kind of post-cartel tacit
collusion. Further, depending on market conditions, the sequence of events may even allow the
cartel to re-establish itself (recidivism).
Although intuitive, ”post-cartel” behavior have been scarcely addressed in the theoretical liter-
ature. The primary reference is still the work of Harrington (2004), who developed a post-cartel
pricing model during litigation. The model considers that firms assess the likelihood of having
to compensate for the damage caused by the cartel and act strategically, maintaining, during
the litigation phase, prices at levels above those of competition, generating an underestima-
tion in damage value (the estimation of cartel’s damage is, in general, based on but-for prices,
which take pre and post-cartel values as reference). Erutku and Hildebrand (2010) studied the
fuel market in Quebec, Canadian province, and gave some empirical validity to Harrington’s
model. They obtained results that show a bias between competitive prices and those observed
when firms act strategically to reduce the damage estimate. According to the authors, this
bias diminishes over time as the litigation process comes to an end, but it increases when the
authorities file criminal charges.
In addition to Harrington’s approach, on the other hand, there is vast empirical literature on
the effects of anti-cartel policy, but with divergent results, as referenced in Ordóñez-de Haro
and Torres (2014). Ordóñez-de-Harro and Torres extensively analyzed a group of actions taken
by Spanish competition authority against cartels in the food industry. They found minimal
effects. Prices have dropped slightly in some markets but got higher in others; therefore, they
didn’t find any evidence of actual gains for consumers. However, it’s interesting to note that,
according to the authors, there was a change in the pricing strategy, manifested in the notable
reduction of price variance. As they suggest, this new strategy was based on prices above
competitive levels but stable to minimize another raid’s risks.
When, after antitrust intervention in the market, prices remain above competitive levels, we
can highlight two scenarios, between many others: the re-establishment/continuity of the price-
fixing scheme (recidivism), or tacit coordination between firms, facilitated by years of commu-
nication and coordination before the discovery of the cartel (residual collusion). The last case
is the hypothesis advanced by Crede (2019), which analyzed the pasta market in Spain, France,
and Italy. The paper shows that prices in Spain and Italy, countries virtually affected by a
cartel, were higher than in France during the collusion and remained higher after the cartel’s
dismantling. The author argues that possible changes in local industries’ structure can hardly
explain these differences. González and Moral (2019) suggest a similar scenario in the Span-
ish fuel market. The authors showed that price levels shortly increased after the competition
authority imposed fines on colluding firms and that these increases largely compensated the
penalties. Therefore, it indicates that consumers are likely to bear penalties costs and that this
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behavior would, in hypothesis, only be possible due to some residual collusion.
The hypothesis of post-cartel tacit collusion, facilitated by the firms’ experience in establishing
coordination during the collusive phase, has been tested in two recent experiments. Fonseca
and Normann (2012) and Chowdhury and Crede (2020) showed that a history of cooperation
facilitates tacit collusion by reducing uncertainty about other firms’ actions that the likeli-
hood of this scenario is strongly linked to the success of the previous collusive phases. Crede
went further and considered the effects of some antitrust measures on the probability of resid-
ual collusion. He showed that changes in the composition of firms operating in the market
(rematching), for example, had a substantial effect in reducing post-cartel tacit collusion.
The possibility of re-establishing/continuing the price-fixing scheme (recidivism) after the ac-
tion of the antitrust authority has received significant attention in antitrust literature, in Europe
and North America, mainly (as far as we know, recidivism in the Brazilian market is a problem,
not addressed yet by literature). Penalties imposed by the authorities (only administrative fines
in some jurisdictions or criminal charges in others, like the USA and Brazil) may not be enough
to discourage collusive behavior in some markets, especially if collusion benefits are still high
and some factors facilitate price-fixing agreements. Some evidence suggests that many compa-
nies are repeat offenders in the EU, so antitrust investigations are weak enforcement. About
this issue, we can cite Lande and Connor (2011); Connor and Bolotova (2006); Smuda (2014).
The authors concluded that both US and European penalties for cartels are not high enough
to achieve deterrence. Levenstein et al. (2015), in a sample composed of cases judged in the
United States and the European Union, between 1961 and 2013, identified a high frequency
of cartelization in chemical, pharmaceutical, and pharmaceutical sectors construction and fuel
stations. Among the factors that facilitate collusion, they mentioned: the inelasticity of de-
mand, market concentration, barriers to entry, industry history, and culture, as well as the
presence of producer associations.
On the other hand, sometimes, even the announcement of an antitrust investigation has the
power to promote changes in market agents’ actions. This happened in Canada, as Clark
and Houde (2014) has shown. The authors found that prices fell just after the Canadian
Competition Bureau’s announced, during May 2006, an investigation into the retail fuel sector.
Yet, as pointed out by González and Moral (2019), they didn’t analyze what happened after
the case was closed, a kind of evidence that could elucidate essential aspects about the dynamic
of post-cartel behavior.
6
3 Brazilian Fuel Market
The fuel market trajectory in Brazil is a typical example of how decades of strict economic
regulation can generate persistent effects on competitive practices. Until the late 1990s, oil
production and commercialization were entirely managed by the Brazilian government. There
was a legal monopoly of a state-owned company, Petrobras, in upstream and refining. There
were controls in prices, margins of sale, and freight in distribution and resale of automotive
fuels. The first attempt to open the market can be traced back to 1996, when prices were set free
in distribution and retail in some regions, like South, Southeast, and Northeast. In 1997, the
Petroleum Law legally broke Petrobras’ monopoly in upstream and initiated a comprehensive
liberalization process through this market. But the process ended only in 2002 when prices
were released in all regions, and gasoline imports were allowed.
In the period that followed the liberalization, many new wholesale traders start to operate
and independent stations, resellers without any contractual relationship with fuel suppliers.
Currently, Brazil fuel market has 206 wholesale traders and about 41 thousand fuel stations,
40% of which are independent (Agência Nacional de Petróleo, 2016). Despite the growing
number of players in the market, there is evidence that free competition still faces cultural and
structural barriers. More than a third of the charges against cartels, filled by CADE in the last
decade, is related, to some extent, to the fuel market, especially the gasoline retail.
The history of official price-fixing practices is a relevant incentive for collusive practices, but
other market characteristics reinforce the trend towards anti-competitive behavior. In Brazil,
fuel refining is, until today, a Petrobras’ non-official monopoly. The state-owned company owns
17 of the 18 refineries operating in the country, across the national territory (the only exception
is Manguinhos refinery, privately owned, but whose production represents less than 2% of the
total). There is also an oligopoly in the distribution chain. The largest group of firms, formed
by Petrobras, Ipiranga, and Ráızen, accounted for about 72% of the total volume of liquid fuels
distributed in Brazil in 2015.
Reselling liquid fuels is the final step in the fuel chain and consists of receiving fuel from the
distributors and serving the final consumer through fuel pumps. Stations have been free to
set their prices since 2002. In theory, this would be a highly competitive market: it’s local,
dispersed, with many firms selling a homogeneous product. In practice, however, the number of
competitors varies significantly between locations, and there are focal points and homogeneous
costs due to the concentration of refining and distribution and the integrated relationship
between distributors and branded stations.
Regulatory barriers to entry also characterize the fuel market. A fuel station needs both
environmental licenses and authorization from ANP (Brazilian National Agency of Petroleum,
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Natural Gas, and Biofuels) to operate. In some cities, there is even evidence that the resellers’
lobby has influenced municipalities to impose regulatory difficulties on the entry for major
competitors, such as stations installed at large commercial surfaces or supermarkets (a well-
documented case in charges against the Brasilia cartel, for example). Additionally, competitors’
prices are easy to monitor (Brazilian legislation requires easy visualization) and are notable the
resellers’ unions’ presence (often standardizing commercial practices). So, it’s very likely the
prevalence of collusive conduct in this market.
Lastly, it is worth noting that, until the end of 2016, the government informally imposed a
policy to Petrobras that prevented the adjustment of fuel prices based on the variation in
international oil price. We can highlight two relevant consequences for competition in the
gasoline market. First, this policy hampered the conditions for importing firms, worsening
Petrobras’ market power problem. Second, during many years, price adjustments in refining
were relatively rare. Considering that the wholesale price is the essential cost for fuel stations,
this stable environment may have reduced imprevisibility and informational frictions in the
market, facilitating the collusive arrangement and monitoring. Changes in refining price policy
may have helped to breakdown price-fixing behaviors in recent years.
4 Econometric strategy
As stated before, the most adopted approach to measure the effects of competition policy in
cartel cases relies on an estimation of a before-and-after price dummy regression. The idea is
to fit a reduced form regression model as follows:
pt = α1 + α2dummyt + βxt + εt (1)
Where, pt is the price level at period t, xt is a vector of demand and cost shifters, and the
dummy variable indicates the cartel period, before the antitrust intervention (dummyt = 1 if
the observation in time t are included in cartel phase, dummyt = 0 after the action against
cartel, given the assumption that the raid ended the scheme). In the policy evaluation process,
our attention is on α2. Suppose the regression model is correctly specified, and the parameter is
positive and statistically significant. In that case, we can interpret it as a positive margin over
the competitive price level, strong evidence about the cartel’s existence, and an argument favor-
ing the change in market behavior after the authority’s enforcement. In general, these models
are suitable because they don’t require much data, and their results are easy to interpret.
When the information available allows, the assessment process can be more robust if the research
exploits some cross-sectional data. With the difference-in-difference approach, the econometri-
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cian uses panel data from different periods and markets (some that are affected by the cartel,
the treated group, and another that aren’t, the control) to estimate treatment effects. This
last approach has a negative aspect: researchers should select the markets exogenously in the
control group and accept an assumption about the common trend between prices from control
and treatment units.
More recently, as in Motta and Resende (2019), another technique has been adopted to en-
dogenize the control group choice or weighting. The Synthetic Control Method consists of a
counterfactual construction based on a weighted mean of markets that are not treated: synthetic
controls models optimally choose a set of weights which when applied to a group of correspond-
ing units produce an optimally estimated counterfactual to the unit that received the treatment.
This counterfactual, called the synthetic unit, outlines what would have happened to the aggre-
gate treated unit had the treatment never occurred (Cunningham, 2018).
As was discussed in the introduction, all these models have some critical downsides. First,
they assume that the changes between collusive and non-collusive periods occur only as price
levels shift (in other words, only in the intercept or in the outcome means). As an example,
the regression’s coefficients in before-and-after are not necessarily the same through different
market regimes. Cost pass-through to price can be different, as shown in the collusion literature.
Second, the dummy, diff-and-diff, and synthetic controls all assume that the official cartel
breakdown date or the legally established collusion period are correct, which can be extremely
misleading, especially when dealing with a supposed recurrent cartel, as in the fuel market.
When relying only on official information, our results for overcharges may be overestimated,
as they will possibly include price wars periods in the collusive phase. Or our impact measure
may be understated if we are not considering transition periods (the beginning or breakdown of
a cartel scheme isn’t necessarily a sharp event, as argues Harrington, 2004). Finally, we don’t
know if the antitrust intervention extinguished the cartel scheme. The breakdown could be
only temporary, and the traditional approaches usually ignore the post-cartel dynamics. Even
when the researchers look at data in different periods, they, in practice, are groping in the dark
since the date choices are still outside the model.
To evaluate the antitrust policy in the Brazilian fuel market (overcoming this bias from misspec-
ifying effective collusion periods and accessing more accurately the actual post-cartel behavior
dynamics), we will combine three approaches: tests for multiple structural changes (Bai and
Perron tests), Markov Switch Regressions (MRS) and a traditional IO structural model design
to estimate the market conduct parameter (Structural model).
Our tests still consider the same reduced form model shown above, with demand and cost
shifters, but in an extended version of the Data Generation Process (DGP), including dynamic,
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as an auto-regressive distributed lags form (ARDL). Specifically in Bai and Perron’s approach,
for the DGP may exist m potential breaks in our data series (producing m+ 1 regimes):






βjlxt−l + εt (2)
Taking the regimes j = 0, . . . ,m, is worth noting that the intercept, coefficients for autoregres-
sive and for demand/cost shifters variables may vary across them. If the number and dates
(T1, ..., Tm) of the regime breakpoints were predetermined, the model could be estimated using
standard least squares approach. But, in our application, the candidate set of break dates are
unknown. To deal with this kind of problem, Bai and Perron (1998) developed an algorithm for
a global optimization procedure that identifies the breaks and regression coefficients minimizing











However, this minimization is possible only over predetermined sample partitions for which the
minimal segment (or the minimal percentage of observation between two breaks) are bigger than
h, the trimming parameter (so, the suitable h choice depends on the number of observations
in the data). After we obtained the number of breaks, the test between the null hypotheses
of no breaks against m is done using standard F-statistic, a framework previously developed
in Chow (1960). So, estimating successive breakpoints in a specific fuel market, we should be
able to check the cartel behavior through time and evaluate if there is any coincidence between
regime changes and antitrust actions against the cartel.
With Markov Searching Regression (MRS) approach, we could pursue the same goal: map the
cartel behavior and asses if antitrust enforcement was able to change it. But, instead of defining
a minimal segment and letting the model do the work, signaling the regimes, MRS technique
requires, previously, the definition of a maximum number of states in our data series. Given
the possibilities of our sample, the model computational burden, and our assumption about
the possible regimes (collusion and non-collusion), our previous reduced form equation was set











l=0 βlxt−l + εt, st = 2(non− collusion)
(4)
Now, there is an assumption that the pricing behavior depends on an unobserved discrete state
variable St, and, based on that, it’s possible to estimate different DGPs for each st. If we
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assume also that εt are normally distributed, the parameters values can be found maximizing a
mixture log-likelihood function, formed by the normal density function and the one-step ahead
probability of being in one regime or another:














· P (st = m|=t−1, δ)
}
(5)
Where St = (1, 2), δ represents the parameters that determines the regime probabilities, φ is
the standard normal density function and =t−1 is the set of information in previous period.
Further, we should add one more assumption in order to complete the Markov model, setting
that the probability P of been in St follows a first-order chain with transition matrix:
ξ =
 ξ (st = 1|st−1 = 1) ξ (st = 2|st−1 = 1)
ξ (st = 1|st−1 = 2) ξ (st = 2|st−1 = 2)
 (6)
ξ is the probability of switching or remain in one regime or another. Since the Markov
rule implies that the one-step-ahead probabilities depend on previous observation, the log-
likelihood function in equation 5 must be estimated recursively. Following Hamilton (1989)
and Kim (1994), it’s possible to obtain parameters estimates and, with them, calculate filtered
or smoothed probabilities off been in a regime at a specific time. In our work, we adopted the
results from smoothed probabilities to describe cartel behavior evolution thought time because
these probabilities are established considering all the sample information (previous and further
observations).
So far, our empirical strategy must have been able to highlight, with accuracy, a regime change
in observed market. However, the problem of identifying which periods are supposed to be
considered collusive or non-collusive is yet to be solved. We could rely on official documents
to establish when the cartel was active. This type of exogenous procedure is, instead, precisely
what we have tried to avoid. We shouldn’t completely ignore the information from investiga-
tions, but they must always be contrasted with the model’s empirical results. Another option
would be to observe the evolution of prices or gross margins (data available for fuel markets).
Increases in prices or margins would be a signal that we have entered into a collusive regime.
Although relevant, even this piece of information may be misleading since prices and margins
are influenced by demand/cost shocks (margin data are not net from labor or other costs).
That’s why, in our paper, we consider a well-known structural model, with conduct parameter,
(Bresnahan, 1989) a useful tool. This model has been widely adopted and scrutinized in recent
decades. Criticisms about its low power for conduct identifying (underestimation of market
power), as shown in Corts (1999) and Salvo (2004), were not neglected. However, we were not
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interested in the absolute value of the conduct parameter but in its relative variation between
regimes and structural breaks. Therefore, the conduct parameter should be an auxiliary piece
of information and a way to check our findings’ robustness in previous methods. Suppose that
Bai and Perron’s test appointed a structural break or we identify a regime-switching in MRS.
Applying the parameter conduct model with dummies for the two periods in our sample will
point out a change from collusion to non-collusion phase if the first period’s coefficient is higher
than the second one and if the variation is statistically significant. Otherwise, with insignificant
variation, our finding should be considered problematic. Structural model specification and
some practical issues about our data, structural tests, and Markov switching regression will be
discussed in the next section.
5 Data and modeling issues
Recovering the base model in reduced form, our DGP has the generic specification below:















β4lyt−l + εt (7)
The core of our dataset was obtained from the Brazilian fuel regulatory agency (ANP). ANP
conduces, monthly, a survey at fuel station level, which collects and turns public weighted (by
sales) average values for gasoline resale, wholesale and ethanol prices (pgt−l, pwt−l and pet−l),
respectively, our dependent variable, our main cost factor and a substitute good. Additionally,
as cost factor we have labor (wt−l). This variable was constructed using data from the register
of employed and unemployed workers (from the Ministry of Economy) and represents a vari-
ation in labor costs: the sum of wages of hired minus the sum of wages of dismissed stations
employees. Finally, we tested two more variables as demand shifters: the number of vehicles
registered in each location and IBC-BR, the Central Bank’s economic activity index (yt). Due
to the high degree of collinearity, the data on the vehicle fleet were dropped. All data have
monthly observations and were available for the period from 2004 to 2019 (until July, for B.
Horizonte and Braśılia cases, and November for Londrina and S. Lúıs). Further, to model the
conduct parameter, the vehicle fleet variable was recovered, and we added gasoline sales (ANP),
which covers only the period 2004-2018 (except for Braśılia, where we have data from 2012 to
2019).
The literature regarding the structural break tests indicates that the results’ accuracy depends
mainly on the correct DGP specification (Crede, 2019). Therefore, it’s recommended that the
model goodness-of-fit and the structure of lags had been previously evaluated in a base period,
gathering observations from a competition phase. However, in our case, this means a severe
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Table 1: Variables and data sources
Variable Source Details
Gasoline Retail Price pgt ANP Weighted (by sales) monthly average prices (BR Real/L)
Gasoline Wholesale Price pwt ANP Weighted (by sales) monthly average prices (BR Real/L)
Gasoline sales qt ANP Monthly sales of gasoline by wholesalers (m
3)
Ethanol pet ANP Weighted (by sales) monthly average prices (BR Real/L)
Labor Costs wt
Register of Employed and Unemployed
workers, Ministry of Economy)
Sum of wages of hired minus the sum of wages
of dismissed stations employees (BR Real)
Economic Activity Index yt Brazilian Central Bank IBC-BR: Monthly economic activity index (base: Jan-2003)
Vehicles fleet vt Dentram (Brazilian Traffic Department) Montlhy local vehicle fleet
weakness since there is no way to guarantee that we know in advance which observations can
be considered at the competition regime. As a second-best option, we chose to adjust the
model on a sample partition before what was officially delimited, in the antitrust proceedings,
as the cartel period. However, this DGP may contain collusive periods not identified by the
authorities, and, therefore, from now on, the results of the structural break test should be
analyzed with caution. We should first combine all the information available in our results to
state whether the regime change means a transition from non-collusive to collusive periods or
otherwise (this highlights the importance of using other methods in our inference processes,
such as MRS and conduct parameter).
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Table 2: Specification of DGPs (data before official cartel period)
Variable Braśılia Belo Horizonte São Lúıs Londrina
Constant
0.009 0.006* 0.009 -0.000674
(0.008) (0.003) (0.005) (0.010)
0 0 0 0
Gasoline retail price(-1)
-0.323*** -0.392*** -0.314493*** -0.128795
(0.103) (0.091) (0.086) (0.125)
1 1 1 1
Gasoline wholesale price
2.137*** 1.182*** 1.279*** 1.115***
(0.313) (0.0888) (0.417) (0.398)
0 0 0 1





-0.139* 0.068** -0.042 -0.054
(0.104) (0.032) (0.145) (0.101)
0 1 0 0
Labor costs
0.0002 0.00003 0.007*** 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.002) (0.000747)
0 0 4 1
Economic Activity Index (IBC-BR)
0.008** 0.0005 -0.007** -0.002
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
2 0 1 0
Adjusted R2 0.585 0.885 0.752 0.588
Observations 47 35 32 35
Period 2004M01 2007M12 2004M01 2006M12 2004M01 2006M12 2004M01 2006M12
Dependent variable: retail gasoline prices (source: ANP). All variables are in first differences and
adjusted for seasonality. Coefficients with ***, **, and * are significant at level 1, 5, and 10%.
The third row of each variable indicates the lag that was used in the regression.
The results from fitting a DGP for each of the four markets analyzed are displayed in table 2 and
the diagnostics tests are in table 3. It’s worth noting that our lag structure is as parsimonious
as possible, only enough to fit the model adequately. Since Bai and Perron’s algorithm has
a partitioning procedure based on the trimming parameter, the inclusion of many regressors
could compromise the convergence proprieties of our estimation. In general, the coefficients
show an expected pattern, with some deviations, especially on demand shifters (there are
negative signs in Ethanol and IBC-BR coefficients, what might be explained by Rotemberg and
Saloner (1986) model of ’price wars’ during business cycles booms, considering that we didn’t
rule out the possibility of including observations from cartel period). Another relevant aspect
in our DGPs is that there is heteroskedasticity or serial correlation in São Lúıs and Londrina.
Therefore, we must process their structural break tests with robust standard errors.
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Table 3: DGPs residual diagnostic tests
Test Null hypothesis
Braśılia Belo Horizonte São Lúıs Londrina
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Jaque-Berra Normally distributed 0.39 0.81 0.18 0.91 0.97 0.61 7.3 0.02
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Homoskedasticity 4.32 0.63 9.67 0.28 6.5 0.36 16.5 0.02
Breusch-Godfrey No serial correlation 3.68 0.15 2.6 0.11 5.1 0.07 2.7 0.25
Ramsey RESET Correct specification 0.63 0.52 0.84 0.40 1.18 0.24 1.2 0.23
We must state one last observation about structural break tests. There is no predefined ideal
trimming parameter. Additionally, the Bai and Peron’s test can be conducted allowing, or not
different error distributions through the breaks, and neither there is an ideal choice. A robust
way to deal with these issues is to estimate our breaks with different trimming parameters and
homogeneity and heterogeneity in error distributions to check if the results are consistent.
In the case of Markov Switching Regression, as highlighted by Boshoff and van Jaarsveld (2019),
the principal practical aspect is the model sensibility to which variables can vary between
regimes (in MRS, not only the coefficients may change but also the error variance). That’s why
the initial step of our estimation is a model selection based on information criterion.
As stated before, the variation in our sample doesn’t allow more than two regimes, so the
decision was only about regime-dependent variables and error variances. As we can see from
table 4 (the best model is in bold), in Brasilia case, there is regime-dependence on intercept,
auto-regressive term, wholesale price, ethanol, and error variance. In the Belo Horizonte fuel
market, the error variance is neither regime determined nor the labor coefficient. In São Lúıs,
ethanol, IBC-BR, and labor are not dependent. Londrina didn’t observe regime variation in
error variance, ethanol, and labor variables.
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Table 4: Model selection by information criterion (Akaike)
Switching parameters Braśılia B. Horizonte São Lúıs Londrina
C - - - -
CAR - -3.419 -2.086 -2.540
CARW -2.252 -3.525 -2.114 -2.547
CARWE -2.261 -3.639 -2.105 -2.540
CARWI -2.258 -3.604 -2.105 -2.551
CARWEI - -3.641 - -2.543
CARWL -2.251 -3.515 -2.105 -2.545
CARWS - -3.554 -2.377 -
CARWSE -2.349 -3.630 -2.355 -2.493
CARWSI – - -2.366 -2.360
CARWSL - - -2.367 -
Abbreviations: (AR) Gasoline retail(-1), (C) Constant, (W) Gasoline
wholesale, (E) Ethanol, (I) IBC-BR, (L) Labor costs, (S) Error vari-
ance. All prices in the estimation were deflated using INPC (Brazilian
consumer’s inflation index).
Finally, for the conduct parameter, it’s necessary to define a structural model formulated by
a system of a demand and a pricing equations. For demand, we have a linear specification as
follows:
qt = α + β1pgt + β2pet + β3yt + β4vt + εt (8)
Where, qt is the monthly quantity of gasoline (in m
3) sold in the market analyzed; pgt and pet,
are, as before, gasoline retail and ethanol prices; yt is the economic activity index; and vt is the
local vehicle fleet.





+ γ0 + γ1pwt + γ2wt + εpt (9)
pwt and wt are cost factors (gasoline wholesale price and labor); β1 is a coefficient taken from
the demand estimation, and λ is the conduct parameter. This parameter nests a set of pos-
sible market structures: competition, if equals 0, monopoly or perfect collusion, if equals 1;
cournot-nash, if equals 1/N , where N is the number of firms. Or it may represents an interme-
diate market power index if the values are different from benchmarks models. To identify the
regimes/periods highlighted by our approach as collusive or non-collusive, it’s necessary to add
dummies interacting with conduct parameters (we found that Markov probabilities are more
reliable to distinguish periods, so we use its results to set the dummies). Therefore, the pricing








+ γ0 + γ1pwt + γ2wt + εpt (10)
The subscript p is the period, n is the number of periods signaled by the Markov approach
(in our setting, this n periods can be in two regimes, collusion or non-collusion), and λp is the
conduct parameter specific for each period. In a specific period, If this parameter is close to 0, it
is plausible that we should identify it as a competition phase. Values departing from 0 may be
seen as more collusive ones (remembering that this approach underestimates the true conduct,
and we are not expecting values close to 1). To test if the variation between parameter/periods
is significant, we applied Wald tests comparing a period with the previous one. It’s worth noting
that the system of equation has endogenous variables (qt and pgt). We need to proceed with
our estimation with instrumental variables in a two-step least-squares approach for unbiased
coefficients. In our case, the instruments were excluded cost and demand factors and lagged
gasoline and ethanol prices.
6 Results
This section will provide the main results from our econometric strategy, focusing on describing
the cartel behavior during antitrust enforcement (or what has been named post-cartel behavior).
We will first present a brief historical context for each of the markets analyzed, highlighting
some authorities’ measures. Then we will confront these events with breaks estimated by Bai
and Perron’s test and with the smoothed probabilities of being in collusion regime provided by
Markov switching method. Finally, it will be checked if the conduct parameters are sensitive
to changes pointed out by our approach. Additional results from our estimations are in the
paper’s appendices A and B.
6.1 Braśılia
Despite not been closed yet, the Brasilia’s cartel case is, in many senses, extremely relevant
in the recent Brazilian antitrust history. First, this cartel managed to raise prices in the
wealthiest and highly educated city and the country’s capital. It was operating literally at
the neighborhood of Antitrust Authority’s (CADE) headquarter. Moreover, the cartel scheme
was, somehow, common knowledge years before the antitrust action. Maybe because of these
former aspects, CADE, and other authorities, acted with great strengthen during and after the
Dubai Operation (the initial raid against cartel’s members), imposing preliminary penalties
and conditions on firms and individuals that haven’t been seen in fuel markets before.
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Figure 1: Brasilia - timeline
Officially, the cartel investigation began in 2009 after a complaint. In May 2012, the firms
received a formal notification about the preliminary proceeding, and this, hypothetically, could
be considered the first possible breakdown event. But, apparently, the cartel remained active.
In November 2015, CADE and judicial authorities conducted the first phase of the Dubai
Operation, which fulfilled dozens of search and seizure warrants, temporary arrests, and coercive
bench.
After the operation, Cade continued to screen the market and found that the prices were still
above the competitive level. Besides, the evidence gathered in the investigation demonstrated
that the company Cascol, the leader in Brasilia’s fuel retail market, was also one of the cartel’s
leaders. That’s why, in March 2016, the antitrust authority imposed a preventive intervention
in the Cascol administration, appointing an independent administrator to manage the fuel
stations. Also, in 2016, in May, there was another raid, Dubai Operation II, which fulfilled
more search and seizure warrants. In April 2017, Cade’s Administrative Court approved a
Termination Commitment Agreement signed with Cascol. Under this agreement, the company
paid an amount of US$ 20 million in fees and made a disinvestment commitment, accepting to
sell several of its fuel stations. In July 2018, the Brazilian federal Court received the criminal
charges against cartel members.
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Figure 2: Braśılia - gasoline price evolution (2004-2019). The dashed lines indicate cartel dates, as
shown on the timeline.
When judicial authorities presented criminal charges at Court, they considered that the cartel
scheme began in early 2011. If we look at the price series (figure 2) we found a small price
increasing around January-April 2011, but it’s temporary and follows an increase in wholesale
values. In another relevant event date, May 2012 (when firms were informed about antitrust
investigation), prices remained stable, although there was some gasoline costs variation. There-
fore, there is no apparent behavior indicating that the cartel was somehow affected. Going
further, after the first phase of Dubai Operation, what is possible to retain is that prices were
rising and that antitrust action didn’t reverse this trend. Unlike, the next three events, espe-
cially CADE’s intervention, were followed by decreases in prices, although it’s no possible yet
to disentangle from wholesale price evolution. So, the price behavior is not informative; that’s
why we must rely on other approaches, hoping that they will give clear information.
Table 5: Braśılia - structural breaks dates
h Homogeneity
0.10 may/10 aug/11 nov/12 - - may/15 may/16 - feb/18
0.15 nov/10 - nov/12 - sep/14 - mar/16 - feb/18
h Heterogeneity
0.10 may/10 aug/11 nov/12 dec/13 - may/15 may/16 may/17 mai/18
0.15 nov/10 - nov/12 - sep/14 - mar/16 - feb/18
Global vs m-breaks Bai and Perron Test (significant at level 5%)
Unfortunately, results from structural break tests are also unclear (table 5). The break dates
vary greatly with trimming parameters. Even when exists a match between them; there isn’t
certainty about what kind of regime (collusion or non-collusion) is operating between breaks. A
problem expected in our approach because the sample comes from a market where the collusion
is probably unstable (given the high number of firms). Price-fixing schemes can operate for a
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long time, but they will be affected by recurrent price wars, and the number of breaks may
highlight this. Despite unclear results, it’s worth noting that there is no break in early 2011,
neither around November 2015 (Dubai Operation). But there is a break around March-May
2016 when CADE appointed an independent administrator to manage Cascol stations.
In figure 3, we added another layer to the price evolution graph. The continuous black line in-
dicates the smoothed probabilities of being in a collusion regime (resulting from the estimation
of a Markov Switching Regression Model). The dashed black lines are the break dates resulted
from Bai and Perron’s test (with homogeneity in errors distribution and trimming parameter
h = 10). It’s worth noting that there are some coincidences between breakpoints and prob-
abilities changes, which give credibility to our results. There is also another relevant aspect.
Structural break tests lost several regime changes because they are too short (it identified only
the beginning of 2010’s apparently price war, and only the endpoint of another one in 2015,
as an example). On the other hand, the structural break approach was sensible to behavior
changes between 2011 and 2013, which did not affect the probabilities.
Figure 3: Braśılia - collusion probabilities and breaks (2004-2019). The gray doted lines indicate the
price evolution and official cartel dates, the black dashed lines are the breaks estimated in Bai Perron
Test (homogeneity and h = 10).
On the cartel’s behavior through antitrust litigation, it’s possible to retain some points. First
and most important: the initial raid against cartel members (Operation Dubai I) was ignored by
the agents. They were supposedly re-establishing the cartel after a price war at the beginning of
2015 and remained with collusive practices after the antitrust action. But, apparently, measures
taken after Dubai Operation were enough to breakdown the cartel (and the intervention in the
Cascol administration seems to have been the most effective). There is a perturbation in this
trend around 2018, but at that time, Brazil suffered from a truck drivers’ strike and saw fuel
shortages, which may have affected the outcomes from the market. Second point: Braśılia’s
cartel probably was longer than judicial authorities seem to believe. Our results indicate that
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it might have begun in 2007, not in 2011, and were relatively persistent until 2016.
Table 6: Braśılia - conduct parameter
Periods Parameter F p-value
Jan-2012 to Feb-2016 0.089 - -
After Mar-2016 0.019 65.73 0.000
F-statistics are testing the significance of variation on
conduct parameter between periods. Data from quan-
tity for Brasilia market are more precise (include only
gasoline sold at local stations), but observations are
available only from 2012.
However, how can we be sure about the fact that probabilities are pointing out a collusive
regime? Our approach took the conduct parameter variation to deal with this question. Until
2016, the conduct parameter was estimated at 0.089. It’s not that high, but after March 2016,
it fell considerably, and this change was highly significant, as can be checked in table 6. Until
July 2019, the period covered by our sample, antitrust intervention can be considered successful.
As informed before, the paper authored by Motta and Resende (2019) argues in favor of our
finding. They applied a Diff-and-Diff approach using the same ANP database and found a
decrease in gasoline prices of about 8% after cartel breakdown in Braśılia.
6.2 Belo Horizonte
Belo Horizonte’s cartel had a fundamental difference compared with Brasilia’s case: antitrust
authority was not a protagonist at the beginning of the investigation, in 2008. Mão Inviśıvel
(Invisible Hand) Operation, the accusation inaugural, was conducted by criminal authorities
with the support of Brazilian federal police. There wasn’t any market intervention, despite the
fulfillment of temporary prison warrants. Only in 2017, CADE imposed fines on colluding firms
and individuals after they signed a Termination Commitment Agreement.
About this cartel case, we must highlight some important dates: judicial authorities considered
that the cartel period spanned from March 2007 to April 2008; police’s dawn raid against scheme
members happened in July 2008, with almost 30 prison warrants; firms and individuals settled
with CADE in April 2017, and CADE’s Administrative Court judged and condemned the cartel
in April 2019. Scheme members were fined in values that summed US$ 35 million.
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Figure 4: Belo Horizonte - timeline
Looking at price series (figure 5), we can identify a shift at the neighborhood of the official
date for cartel beginning, but we are still struggling to disentangle the cartel effect from cost
shocks. The police raid, surprisingly, aren’t so evident in price evolution. On the other hand,
when firms settled with CADE, prices showed a considerable raising pattern, although, once
again, the movement is following the cost trend.
Figure 5: Belo Horizonte - gasoline price evolution (2004-2019). The dashed lines indicate the official
cartel dates, as shown on the timeline.
Now, checking table 7, the structural break tests are still not so informative, with a significant
divergence between the two trimming parameters. However, the relevant information here is
that there is no break date that captured the dawn raid’s effects or, later, the settlement or
the administrative judgment. It’s worth noting that November 2010, January-February 2013,
and September-December 2015 seem to be signaling pattern changes in Belo Horizonte’s fuel
market.
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Table 7: Belo Horizonte - structural breaks dates
h Homogeneity
0.10 apr/08 - nov/10 - jan/13 jun/14 sep/15 dec/16 apr/18
0.15 - jan/09 nov/10 - feb/13 - dec/15 - oct/17
h Heterogeneity
0.10 apr/08 - apr/10 aug/11 jan/13 jun/14 sep/15 dec/16 apr/18
0.15 - jan/09 nov/10 - feb/13 dec/15 - oct/17
Global vs m-breaks Bai and Perron Test (significant at level 5%)
As in Brasilia’s case, the Markov Switching Regression method can better overview the cartel
behavior through time. Let’s observe the data from figure 6. Once again, we saw some matching
between structural breaks and regime changes in MRS probabilities, but shorter episodes are
still missing in Bai and Perron’s approach.
Figure 6: Belo Horizonte - collusion probabilities and breaks (2004-2019). The gray doted lines
indicate the price evolution and official cartel dates, the black dashed lines are the breaks estimated
in Bai Perron Test (homogeneity and h = 10).
What is relevant about the cartel behavior is that we can not be sure if the dawn raid broke
the first cartel appearance in 2008 (it seems to be naturally fading before the police operation).
In the absence of antitrust measures, the market evolution apparently offered conditions to re-
establish the collusive scheme three years later, at the beginning of 2011. Supposedly, the cartel
faded away at the beginning of 2013 and reappeared briefly in 2015. Our findings also indicate
that it’s not operating recently, but there isn’t a clear relationship between its breakdown and
the antitrust authority’s direct actions. At best, we might state that the successive measures
(like Termination Commitment Agreement and the 2019 judgment) helped prevent the cartel’s
resurgence.
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Table 8: Belo Horizonte - conduct parameter
Periods Parameter F p-value
Jan-2004 to Feb-2007 0.052 - -
Mar-2007 to Mar-2008 0.088 17.42 0.000
Apr-2008 to Jan-2011 0.033 33.33 0.000
Feb-2011 to May-2013 0.068 46.25 0.000
After Jun-2013 0.017 135.97 0.000
F-statistics are testing the significance of variation on
conduct parameter between periods.
Finally, the conduct parameters in table 8 reinforce our findings. The values were higher for
periods with high probabilities of been in a collusive regime (March 2007 to March 2008 and
February 2011 to May 2013) and fell considerably after 2013. All the parameter changes were
significant, according to Wald’s tests.
6.3 São Lúıs
Like Belo Horizonte’s cartel, in Sao Lúıs’ case, the investigations, initiated in 2011, were held
by the criminal authorities (Cronos Operation). The antitrust litigation was opened only in
2014 after CADE received transcripts of telephone wiretaps authorized by the Court, as well
as other evidence forwarded by criminal authorities. Recorded conversations showed that the
owners of stations in São Lúıs agreed to set higher prices and induced other stations to do the
same, between February and March 2011. Besides, the investigations revealed the existence of
market-sharing agreements, coordinated by the fuel retailer’s association.
To our analysis, it’s worth retaining the following essential events/date. For criminal and
antitrust litigation, the cartel period was defined between February and March of 2011, during
which criminal authorities conducted Cronos Operation (with telephone wiretaps). CADE filled
the antitrust case in October 2014, and the administrative judgment occurred in June 2017.
Firms and individuals that participate in the cartel were fined US$ 4,2 million approximately.
Finally, in September 2018, fuel retailers settled in Court and signed a commitment not to
exchange information about prices.
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Figure 7: São Lúıs - timeline
If we take the price series in the São Lúıs fuel market (figure 8), there is a sharp increase during
the beginning of 2011. The wholesale price also went up, but its pattern seems to be more
moderate. However, this behavior apparently was not sustainable, maybe because the criminal
authorities turned public the cartel investigation at the same period. Running through the
chain of events, prices got higher after the beginning of antitrust investigation and decreased
following the two last events (CADE’s judgment and agreement in Court), but we don’t yet
have enough evidence to connect these movements with antitrust measures.
Figure 8: São Lúıs - gasoline price evolution (2004-2019). The dashed lines indicate the official cartel
dates, as shown on the timeline.
Alone, with nothing but the break dates, our structural change approach (table 9) is still more
confusing in São Lúıs’ Cartel case. However, the number of breaks and the divergence between
the two trimming parameters are strong evidence of the cartel’s instability. Relevant events
during antitrust litigation seem, instead, to be ignored by break dates. The only and important
exception are the dates from the beginning of 2011, which indicates that probably happened
some changes in the period considered by authorities as to the cartel phase.
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Table 9: São Lúıs - structural breaks dates
h Homogeneity
0.10 nov/08 - mar/10 apr/11 nov/12 dec/13 - jan/15 feb/16 mar/17
0.15 - may/09 - jan/11 sep/12 - may/14 - jan/16 -
h Heterogeneity
0.10 nov/08 - mar/10 apr/11 nov/12 dec/13 - jan/15 feb/16 mar/17
0.15 - may/09 - jan/11 sep/12 - may/14 - jan/16 -
Global vs m-breaks Bai and Perron Test (significant at level 5%)
Cartel’s probability, plotted in figure 9, depicts a volatile scenario. Antitrust and criminal
authorities were partially right in defining the beginning of cartel in February or March 2011,
but, in fact, the agreement between station owners probably was an attempt to re-establish
the scheme that operates previously, between 2006 and 2010. This attempt wasn’t totally
successful, and there are successive comings and goings in price-fixing behavior. This behavior
is a reasonable explanation for the results from the structural breaks method (which, by the way,
are less precise, but not so divergent with MRS findings, as the other two cases analyzed).
Figure 9: São Lúıs - collusion probabilities and breaks (2004-2019). The gray doted lines indicate
the price evolution and official cartel dates, the black dashed lines are the breaks estimated in Bai
Perron Test (homogeneity and h = 10).
We have evidence that actions against the cartel didn’t extinct collusive behavior in the fuel
market. It’s relevant to notice that there was residual collusion with very probable cartel
episodes until 2016. However, they are very short and less effective than the one registered be-
fore 2010 (authorities’ work may have created conditions for this instability, but, unfortunately,
our approach is not enough to disentangle its effects from market changes).
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Table 10: São Lúıs - conduct parameter
Periods Parameter F p-value
Jan-2004 to Oct-2006 -0.032 - -
Nov-2006 to Dec-2009 0.059 63.89 0.000
After Jan-2010 -0.002 8.59 0.003
F-statistics are testing the significance of variation on
conduct parameter between periods.
Once more, the conduct parameter method gave some certainty about our analysis, showing
that the λp was higher between 2006 and 2009 (the cartel’s stable period) and significantly
decreased before 2010 (the phase with short collusive phases).
6.4 Londrina
Londrina’s cartel was extensively analyzed by Cuiabano (2019), who found that the scheme
managed to raise gasoline prices 3.6% to 6.6% above the competitive level. Her estimates
adopted, as a reference, information from antitrust charges, which indicate that the collusive
period spanned from April-May to August 2007. The official’ end date’ for the scheme coincides
with Medusa III Operation, a dawn raid executed by Paraná state’s police and antitrust au-
thorities. This raid fulfilled 16 search and seizure warrants in stations located in Londrina and
neighbors’ municipalities. A previous police investigation, with telephone wiretaps, showed that
collusion started when one of the retailers dropped its price and started a price war between
stations in the Londrina region. So, in April-May 2007, fuel retailers initiated conversations to
agreed on price increases and readjustments dates. Cartel’s leaders used retailer’s association
to expand their agreement to all associates.
Figure 10: Londrina - timeline
In addition to the cartel period and Medusa III operation, we must retain two more relevant
events. CADE administrative court convicted the collusive behavior six years later, in October
2013, with penalties summing up to more than US$ 2,5 million. Criminal authorities presented
in Court charges against the cartel after nine years, in June 2016. There was one last event,
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in February 2020, Paraná’s Court extinguished the case because they exceeded the maximum
time for a criminal case, but our data set doesn’t include this period.
Figure 11: Londrina - gasoline price evolution (2004-2019). The dashed lines indicate the official
cartel dates, as shown on the timeline.
As a naive approach, observing the price series doesn’t offer anything more than some clues
about the effects of antitrust action, as stated in all previous cases. The structural changes
method, instead, provides more pieces of information, although noisy. There aren’t structural
changes in the neighborhood of August 2007 (Medusa III Operation), but there are shifts around
October 2013 and June 2016.
Table 11: Londrina - structural breaks dates
h Homogeneity
0.10 aug/08 dec/09 may/11 aug/12 nov/13 apr/15 aug/16 – aug/18
0.15 – jun/09 aug/11 – jul/13 oct/15 – dec/17 –
h Heterogeneity
0.10 aug/08 dec/09 may/11 aug/12 nov/13 apr/15 aug/16 – aug/18
0.15 – jun/09 aug/11 – jul/13 oct/15 – dec/17 –
Global vs m-breaks Bai and Perron Test (significant at level 5%)
Adding another layer again to our price evolution graph to show the collusion probabilities
and the structural breaks (figure 12), what we get is bad news to antitrust authorities. The
cartel formation captured in criminal authorities’ telephone wiretap was, actually, an attempt
to avoid the cartel breakdown, caused by the price war registered at the beginning of 2007.
It’s worth recognizing that Medusa III Operation may have been the cause for the temporally
end of the cartel between 2008 and 2009, but our results show that the collusion behavior was
persistent, with some instability, until the end of 2015. Markov switching probabilities also
revealed a relatively mild disturbance after the cartel’s conviction at CADE’s Administrative
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Court. However, the collusive scheme kept operating for another two more years, and it’s quite
likely that the recent period of competition is due to market conditions.
Figure 12: Londrina - collusion probabilities and breaks (2004-2019). The gray doted lines indicate
the price evolution and official cartel dates, the black dashed lines are the breaks estimated in Bai
Perron Test (homogeneity and h = 10).
Finally, to test our results reliability, we ran, once more, the conduct parameter estimation over
the regime changes identified by switching regressions. Our findings showed that, between June
2005 and December 2007, λp was higher than in any other period. Relying on our parameter
estimation, it’s also possible to say that there was a competitive phase from January until July
2008. On some level, this market tendency changed to a more collusive pattern after 2008, a
new regime that, with some price wars, was prevalent until the end of 2015. All parameter
changes were statistically significant for Londrina’s sample.
Table 12: Londrina - conduct parameter
Periods Parameter F p-value
Jan-2004 to May-2005 0.072 - -
Jun-2005 to Dec-2007 0.121 17.08 0.0000
Jan-2008 to Jul-2008 0.023 63.32 0.0000
Aug-2008 to Dec-2015 0.064 16.02 0.0000
After Jan-2016 0.027 49.15 0.0000
F-statistics are testing the significance of variation on
conduct parameter between periods.
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7 Policy aspects and conclusions
Concerns about analyzing antitrust policy effectiveness have been increasingly considered in
the empirical literature and the government agents’ practice. As Ordóñez-de Haro and Torres
(2014) points out, this assessment should be made considering the ability to prevent, identify,
and punish anti-competitive behavior. But punishment policies are not so valued if they fail to
restore adequate competition levels in target markets, improving consumers’ welfare and social
distribution of wealthy, which is crucial for unequal countries like Brazil.
Usually, these policies’ success has been measured through methodologies focused on estimating
the impact of antitrust enforcement on prices. From this point of view, the empirical results
have been relatively mixed. it’s not uncommon cases where the outcome of litigation against
price-fixing schemes is well below expectations. The results heterogeneity might be explained
by a whole spectrum of possible post-cartel behaviors: during antitrust litigation, markets can
face a hysteresis effect, changing pricing strategy to avoid high penalties; can also observe a kind
of tacit collusion; or, if conditions are favorable to conspiracy, the cartel may be re-establish.
That’s why studying the market dynamic after the authority’s raid against a specific cartel is
crucial for IO and competition policy literature. For this purpose, models that try to define
the evolution of the affected market endogenously are fundamental, including to attest the
credibility of the results obtained with the most traditional approaches.
As shown before, when relying only on official documents to define dates and events that will
impact their estimation process directly, researchers are severely exposed to the possibility
of end up with misleading results, as correctly argued Boshoff and van Jaarsveld (2019) and
Boswijk et al. (2019). That’s why, in this paper, we left aside the concern of just measuring
the effect on prices and adopted a broad overview through market evolution under antitrust
litigation, using techniques such as structural breaks tests and Markov switching regressions to
analyze whether there was any observable consequence of the action of the Brazilian antitrust
authority in the retail gasoline market. In addition to its relevance to competition policy in
general, this work also contributed to applied research on the sense that, as far as we know,
it’s the first to systematically compare two endogenously cartel dating approaches and, further,
to propose combining them with IO model of conduct parameter to help identify collusion
regimes and, somehow, check the reliability of the results from structural breaks and switching
regressions approaches.
Regarding the methodological issues, our findings showed that Markov regressions were more
robust to the purpose of scrutinizing the evolution of price-fixing schemes in fuel markets.
This is so because its results are more sensible and more straightforward, and less likely to
miss shorter regimes changes. The structural break test’s significant problem is its need for
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a minimum size between break intervals, which strongly depends on our sample’s number of
observations. Since we have theoretical and empirical reasons to suspect that collusion in fuel
markets is, although common, unstable, Bai and Perron’s analysis end up being too sensitive
to trimming parameter choice. When the minimum size between breaks is decreased, the
test obtains many break dates, and it’s hard to interpret without previous knowledge. With
larger trimming parameters, results have better convergence properties but fail to identify some
episodes. We ran a simple simulation comparing methodologies performance in a two regimes
series with low and high persistence to illustrate this point. Results can be checked in the
appendix C.
On the other hand, it can be argued that only two regimes (collusive or non-collusive) in
the fuel market samples are artificially defined, which would be the downside of the MRS.o
Unfortunately, the type of data generated in this market doesn’t have enough variations to
estimate three or more regimes (collusion, competition, and price war, for example). In the
end, we must recognize that sometimes there is a trade-off, and maybe the better option is to
combine the two techniques even if one of them is playing the role of reliability test.
On the competition policy aspects, this work presented some extremely relevant findings. If
our models are reasonably accurate, the current policy’s ability to restore the expected levels of
competition in the cartel-hit market is seriously in doubt. In three out of four cases studied (Belo
Horizonte, São Lúıs, and Londrina), antitrust action had, at most, restricted effects. There
is evidence that dawn raids sometimes temporarily disrupt collusion agreements but do not
extinguish it if market conditions remain the same. Also, the impact of fines imposed on scheme
participants is mitigated when established after years of litigation (and, in Brazil, are always
questioned in Court). Braśılia’s case, however, seems paradigmatic of how strong preventive
measures combined with structural ones, aiming at market reorganization, are supposed to have
lasting effects against price-fixing behavior.
This lesson goes in the same direction advanced by one of the experiments mentioned earlier in
this paper (Chowdhury and Crede, 2020). A history of price coordination reduces uncertainty
between agents involved in collusion and strengthens cartel’s capacities, even allows it to take
a tacit form. So, it’s often necessary for the antitrust authority to act, breaking down entry
barriers and adding new players to the market (a rematching, as happened when CADE imposes
on Cascol the disinvestment in some of its fuel stations). Market forces are more effective in
deterring cartel formation, and the changes in Petrobras pricing policy that took place in 2016
is another example and maybe one of the reasons for less prevalence of collusion recently.
Unfortunately, our empirical design does not sufficiently control this hypothesis to make any
causal relation, which should be an issue for further research.
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González, X. and Moral, M. J. (2019). Effects of antitrust prosecution on retail fuel prices.
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 67. 5, 6
Hamilton, J. D. (1989). A New Approach to the Economic Analysis of Nonstationary Time
Series and the Business Cycle. Econometrica, 57(2):357. 11
Harrington, J. E. (2004). Post-Cartel Pricing during Litigation. The Journal of Industrial
Economics, 52(4):517–533. 5, 9
Kim, C. J. (1994). Dynamic linear models with Markov-switching. Journal of Econometrics,
60(1-2):1–22. 11
Lande, R. H. and Connor, J. M. (2011). Cartel Overcharges and Optimal Cartel Fines. SSRN
Electronic Journal. 6
Levenstein, M. C., Marvão, C., and Suslow, V. Y. (2015). Serial Collusion in Context: Repeat
Offenses by Firm or by Industry? Technical report. 6
Lucinda, C. and Seixas, R. (2016). Prevenção Ótima de Cartéis: O Caso dos Peróxidos no
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A Markov Switching transition matrices




Expected durations 14.831 15.267




Expected durations 22.374 7.857




Expected durations 14.279 6.722




Expected durations 14.378 14.051
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B Structural model (conduct parameter) outputs
Table 17: Braśılia - Structural model (conduct parameter)





















R2 0.881 R2 0.898
Observations 78 Observations 78
Period 2012M01 2019M07 Period 2012M01 2019M07
Dependent variables: sales and gasoline retail prices, respectively (source: ANP). Instruments: ex-
cluded cost and demand factors and lagged gasoline and ethanol prices Coefficients with ***, **, and
* are significant at level 1, 5, and 10%.
Table 18: Belo Horizonte - Structural model (conduct parameter)
Demand Eq. Pricing Eq.
Constant 7.548*** Constant 0.297***
(0.969) (0.088)
Gasoline Retail Price -2.83*** Gasoline Wholesale Price 1.001***
(0.176 ) (0.020)
Etanol Price 1.95*** Labor Costs 0.0001
(0.205) (0.00008)
Cars 0.00000046*** λp: Jan-2004/Feb-2007 0.052**
(0.00000012) (0.021)






λp: After Jun-2013 0.017
(0.013)
R2 0.875 R2 0.968
Observations 179 Observations 180
Period 2004M01 2018M12 Period 2004M01 2018M12
Dependent variables: sales and gasoline retail prices, respectively (source: ANP). Instruments: ex-
cluded cost and demand factors and lagged gasoline and ethanol prices Coefficients with ***, **, and
* are significant at level 1, 5, and 10%.
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Table 19: São Lúıs - Structural model (conduct parameter)
Demand Eq. Pricing Eq.
Constant -0.612*** Constant -1.061 ***
(0.158) (0.033)
Gasoline Retail Price -0.415*** Gasoline Wholesale Price 1.419***
(0.021) (0.039)
Etanol Price 0.542*** Labor Costs 0.001
(0.022) (0.0007)
Cars 0.000003*** λp: Jan-2004/Oct-2006 -0.032
(0.0000001) (0.033)
Economic Activity Index 0.011*** λp: Nov-2006/Dec-2009 0.059*
(0.0008) (0.033)
λp: After Jan-2010 -0.002
(0.015)
R2 0.980 R2 0.951
Observations 180 Observations 191
Period 2004M01 2018M12 Period 2004M01 2018M12
Dependent variables: sales and gasoline retail prices, respectively (source: ANP). Instruments: ex-
cluded cost and demand factors and lagged gasoline and ethanol prices Coefficients with ***, **, and
* are significant at level 1, 5, and 10%.
Table 20: Londrina - Structural model (conduct parameter)
Demand Eq. Pricing Eq.
Constant 2.34*** Constant 0.217
(0.240) (0.210)
Gasoline Retail Price -0.362*** Gasoline Wholesale Price 1.030***
(0.043) (0.035)
Etanol Price 0.221*** Labor Costs 0.0006
(0.032) (0.0004)
Cars 0.0000008*** λp: Jan-2004/May-2005 0.072**
(0.0000001) (0.036)






λp: After Jan-2016 0.027
(0.030)
R2 0.692 R2 0.941
Observations 170 Observations 180
Period 2004M01 2018M12 Period 2004M01 2018M12
Dependent variables: sales and gasoline retail prices, respectively (source: ANP). Instruments: ex-
cluded cost and demand factors and lagged gasoline and ethanol prices Coefficients with ***, **, and
* are significant at level 1, 5, and 10%.
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C Simple simulation: MRS and structural changes
Aiming to demonstrate the relationship between Markov Switching Regressions technique and
structural break tests, we performed a simple simulation exercise. Suppose that, in some mar-
ket, retail prices follows a Markovian DGP, with two regimes, and the following deterministic
formulations:
pt =
 0.2 + 1.1ct − 0.05dt, st = 1(collusion)0.0 + 1.1ct + 0.05dt, st = 2(non− collusion) (11)
Where ct represents the costs and dt the demand shifters and St is the discrete state variable
that defines the regime. The first equation represents a collusive regime (st = 1), in which there
is an increase in the price level (intercept) and, as in Rotemberg and Saloner model, there is
an anti-cyclical response to demand. The second is defined as a kind of oligopolistic market
regime (st = 2) where agents establish a small markup on costs. In our simulation study,
Markov transition matrices have two possible profiles, with high or low persistence regimes, as
shown in table 21.









To simulate our market, also consider that the cost and demand vectors have their own DGPs,
characterized by an AR (1) process, with idd shocks (εt and vt), and a specific intercept:
 ct = 1.0 + 0.8ct−1 + εt,dt = 0.2 + 0.9dt−1 + vt (12)
This basic model generated two price series with 300 observations each, as can be seen in
figures 13 and 14. Estimating a model of Markovian Regressions, we may obtain the filtered
and smoothed probabilities observed in figures 15 and 16.
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Figure 13: Simulation - simulated price series with two high persistence regimes. The gray shaded
area indicates the collusion regime.
Figure 14: Simulation - simulated price series with two low persistence regimes. The gray shaded
area indicates the collusion regime.
Figure 15: Simulation - smoothed and filtered probabilities for high persistence regimes. Regime 1
is the collusive one.
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Figure 16: Simulation - smoothed and filtered probabilities for low persistence regimes. Regime 1 is
the collusive one.
It’s worth noting that the series with low persistence (a DGP more like our set of cartel cases
in the fuel market) presents several short periods of collusion (11 episodes of a cartel, with 22
structural breaks), followed by others of competition. On the other hand, in series with high
persistence, there are fewer regime changes (only three periods of a cartel and six breaks) and
more observations between them. So, let’s check how Bai and Perron’s test performed when
estimating structural breaks for these two series, allowing for changes in the crucial trimming
parameter (h). Our estimation’s primary results, the observations where Bai and Perron’s test
signaled a structural break, can be seen in table 22.
Table 22: Simulation - Breaks identified by Bai and Perron’s test (observations)
h High Persistence Low Persistence
0.15 45, 89, 174, 218 53, 100, 183
0.10 53, 89, 189, 218 42, 75, 152, 183, 222, 268
0.05 53, 89, 187, 201, 218 53, 75, 152, 166, 183, 209, 223, 268, 282
0.02
6, 53, 65, 89, 99, 144, 189, 201, 209,
218, 227, 237
8, 42, 47, 53, 75, 89, 94, 129, 134, 152,
159, 183, 189, 201, 209, 217, 222,
268, 279, 286, 291
We did not perform a Monte Carlo simulation with hundreds of simulated samples because
our goal was only to illustrate conclusions about the downsides of structural breaks tests.
However, just with this simple exercise, we could show that structural break test performance
is not satisfactory when there are recurrent regime changes in the market. In our series of low
persistence regimes, with a trimming parameter of 0.15, the estimation found only 3 out of 22
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breaks. When the minimum number of observations between sample partitions are reduced,
the test showed better results, signaling more correct breaks. But this gain in reducing the type
II errors came with losses in robustness for the type I. It’s worth noting that with h = 0.02,
the test returns a significant number of false breaks (a phenomenon explained by the terrible
convergence proprieties when there are only six observations between intervals).
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